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Abstract: 
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1 Introduction 
 
One of the most interesting puzzles concerning the behavior of real wages over 
the business cycle is their failure to adjust downwards in the face of exceptional increases 
in unemployment during the Great Depression.  In fact, evidence from the United States 
supports the view that real wages were not merely unresponsive to unemployment 
changes at this time but apparently positively related (Bernanke and Powell, 1986).  One 
potential reason is that indicators of external market conditions, such as the rate of 
unemployment, only partially represent the key forces acting on the wage.  Firms’ 
intensive margins matter.  Theories of rent sharing, efficiency wages and implicit 
contracts recognize the importance of within-company implicit or explicit agreements 
that serve to shield workers, at least in part, against excessive fluctuations in per period 
earnings stemming from external market forces.   
Bernanke (1986) provides perhaps the best known attempt to tackle the puzzle of 
counter-cyclical U.S. wages in the 1930s.  This work brings the intensive margin 
prominently into play by emphasising the role of hours of work.  Weekly hours fell in 
response to the severe cyclical downturn.1  However, if hours had been allowed to fall by 
the fully required amount, any value to workers of increased leisure would have been far 
more than offset by their loss of consumption due to reduced weekly earnings.  Firms 
were constrained by workers’ reservation utilities from cutting earnings to the same 
extent as the hours reductions with the result that average hourly earnings could remain 
constant, or even rise, as labor demand fell.  Bernanke tests this story with industry-level 
earnings equations in which nominal weekly earnings are expected to relate positively to 
                                                 
1 There were also strong hours’ effects in Britain at this time with important implications for earnings 
adjustments.  See Hart (2001) for a discussion of the British Engineering Industry. 
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weekly hours and to industry employment as well as positively to workers’ reservation 
utilities as captured by a group of variables that include union power and the cost of 
living.  
In Bernanke’s story, the firm cuts working time in response to a demand fall but, 
in order to ensure that employees turn up for work, it may feel constrained not to cut 
earnings to the same extent.  This does not rule out the possibility, assuming diminishing 
returns, that hourly productivity remained fairly stable.  We also emphasise the 
importance of the intensive margin.  However, we concentrate on the fact that hourly 
labor productivity in manufacturing fell considerably during the period 1929 to 19332.  
This meant, effectively, that work intensity reduced as represented by an increased excess 
of total paid-for to actual effective hours worked.   We are concerned to find out whether 
this change in work intensity directly impacted on the wage.     
Technological and organizational constraints, scheduling requirements of 
suppliers and customers, and working time custom and practice may have variously 
prevented full downward hours adjustment to the severe fall in product demand 
experienced during the early 1930s.  The implied reductions in hourly work intensity may 
have resulted from, among other possibilities, reductions in the speed of production 
throughput or in the number of required job tasks per unit of time or even through 
increases in the length of daily rest periods. In effect, changes in work intensity offered a 
means, alongside changes in earnings and employment, of adjusting to the new trading 
climate.  In our set-up, management and workers seek to reach agreement on the desired 
                                                 
2  Cole and Ohanian, (1999, Table 6) show that labor productivity – measured in terms of output per hour – 
fell in 1932/33 to about 12 percent below its 1929 detrended level.  Thereafter it rose quite speedily, 
returning to trend in 1936. Ohanian (2002) discusses a range of factors influencing productive efficiency 
that may have contributed to these observed movements, and we return to the implications of his 
suggestions in our concluding section. 
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mix of earnings levels, labor inputs (workers and hours), and the degree of work 
intensity.  There is some precedent for adopting this modelling approach. In a firm-union 
bargaining context, Johnson (1990) argues strongly that work intensity is an issue on 
collective bargaining agendas.   
Essentially, we follow an important paper by Taylor (1970) in this journal by 
proxying work intensity within an empirical wage specification that also embraces the 
unemployment rate.  The latter variable enters our model via its influence on 
compensation in workers’ alternative employment. Following Darby et al. (2001), our 
arguments are formalized within a simple efficient bargaining framework in which 
earnings, employment, hours and work, and work intensity are choice variables.  We 
undertake empirical tests on United States manufacturing using a data set originally 
constructed and analysed by Bernanke and Parkinson (1991).   
 
2 An efficient bargain 
Ignoring the capital stock3, the firm's production function is given by 
 
(1)   Q = F(θ, h, N)  
with 00 <′′>′ F,F and where Q is output, θ is average work intensity, h is average paid-
for weekly hours, N is the size of the workforce.  Work intensity is an index, with 0≤ θ 
≤1.  Essentially, including θ in the production function serves to convert paid-for into 
effective hours worked. 
Also ignoring fixed costs of employment for simplicity4, profit is expressed 
                                                 
3   Primarily because the inclusion of capital and its user cost changes nothing of substance in our main 
concern, the wage determination process. 
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(2)  π = pF(θ, h, N) – yN 
where p is the product price, y is average weekly earnings. Specifically, y = wh where w 
is the average hourly wage rate. 
 
For the representative worker, positive utility derives from wage earnings, while 
disutility stems from greater work intensity over the workweek and from the loss of 
leisure. Assuming fixed disutilities of work intensity and hours, utility is expressed 
(3)  *)( yhhyuu −−−= βγθ   
where y* is weekly compensation in alternative employment and β and γ are constants.5  
Assuming that the worker is risk neutrality, or 0u0,u =′′>′ and aggregating over the 
whole workforce, N, gives workers’ utility as 
(4)  *)( yhhyNU −−−= βγθ  .  
The generalised Nash bargain (Svejnar, 1986) is the solution to the problem 
(5)   ααθ π Umax 1Nh,,y, −=J  
where α represents workers’ relative bargaining power (or ‘strength’), with α∈{0,1}. 
From the first-order conditions, we obtain 
(6)   γθβ +=
N
pFh       
                                                                                                                                                 
4  Thus, we discount the possibility that the firm may negotiate the level of worker quality and associated 
training costs.  For extensions along these lines see Hart and Moutos (1995). 
5  Slightly more explicitly, we can write work-related utility as u{y - δθh - β(1 - θ)h} where δ and β are 
constants.  This divides the workweek into effective hours worked, θh, and additional hours worked, (1 - 
θ)h.  Disutility from the first part stems from the degree of work intensity.  The second part represents non-
work activity but still adds to disutility because workplace attendance is required.  In general, we might 
expect that δ > β.  In the equivalent expression in  (3) γ = δ - β.  
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or the average marginal product of hours is equal to the cost of employing an extra hour.  
This cost is equal to the marginal disutility of hours worked.  Similarly, we obtain  
(7)   pF h
N
θ γ=  
i.e. the average marginal product and marginal disutilities of effort are equated.  
Optimal employment is achieved by equating marginal value product to a 
worker's opportunity cost of work, or 
(8)   NpF h h y*.γθ β= + +  
Of key importance to present developments, the equilibrium wage6 is given by 
(9) NpF)(1N
pQ αα −+=y . 
If the workforce has no bargaining power, or α = 0, the firm is on its demand curve, with 
marginal product equal to the marginal cost of an additional worker.   At the other 
extreme, α = 1, the firm receives zero profit. 
Combining (8) and (9) produces 
(10)     pQy (1 )( h h y*)
N
α α γθ β= + − + +  
and this can be written in hourly terms as 
(11)  pQw w *
Nh
ϕ ϕ ϕ θ ϕ= + + +0 1 2 3   
where w* is the outside hourly wage (=y*/h)7, and ϕ's are parameters. This is our core 
wage equation: the wage rate is dependent on hourly productivity, hourly work intensity 
and the outside hourly wage.   
                                                 
6  The first-order condition, JN=0 to the problem in (5) is given by  NU ( )(pF y) U U / N=0
− − −− − +α α α απ α π α1 11   
Multiplying through this expression by Uα απ − and re-arranging produces equation (9).  
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  As will be seen in the following Section and beyond, our approach to estimation 
allows us to distinguish between long-run and short-run influences on the wage. With this 
in mind, and without detracting significantly from our basic story, we believe that there 
are advantages in extending our interpretation of the roles of productivity and work 
intensity somewhat beyond the confines of our simple model.  Rather than seek to reach 
agreement over current productive performance, we assume that the parties link the wage 
to potential productivity.8   We can think of potential productivity as the maximum 
expected hourly output when all factors are fully utilised.   Corresponding wage increases 
would depend on long term technical, organizational, and human capital improvements. 
The work intensity term then serves to account for periods when actual productivity falls 
short of potential productivity and the parties recognize shorter term wage adjustments 
may need to accommodate this. 
An immediate gain from these interpretations is that we can take advantage of the 
simple intensity expression of Fair (1985).  This is given by 
(12)     
*φ
φθ =  
where φ = Q/Nh is actual hourly productivity – or output per paid-for worker hours - and 
φ* is potential hourly productivity.  Our measure of φ* replaces the hourly productivity 
term in (11).  The outcome φ = φ* implies θ = 1 or the firm is operating at maximum 
work intensity. In this case, actual and paid-for hours of work coincide.  This is assumed 
to occur at the cyclical peak points of φ (=φ*).   If the firm were to maintain the path 
                                                                                                                                                 
7  The outside wage is expressed in terms of 'inside' weekly hours.  It seems not unreasonable to assume 
that, in comparing inside and outside hourly earnings, workers will deflate by hours currently experienced.   
8 Current productivity is especially relevant to wage determination that involves incentive pay (such as 
piece rates) in which output and the quality of output are perpetually monitored.   
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satisfying φ = φ*, then only long-term capital, training, and organizational changes would 
affect the wage.  If φ < φ*, work intensity is below its maximum (ie. actual productivity 
falls short of potential productivity) and the parties may agree to an offsetting wage 
reduction. 
The value of the expected outside union wage, w* in (11), results from two 
components weighted by their probability of their occurrence.  First, the value of the 
expected wage obtained if the worker is re-employed.  Second, the replacement rate 
received if the worker is unemployed. The probability of gaining employment should 
relate negatively to the rate of unemployment.  For simplicity, we capture the fallback 
wage by the linear approximation 
(13)  w* = w  + η1 u + η2 r 
where w  is the average wage in the economy, u is unemployment, r is the replacement 
ratio and η's are parameters. Based on the data provided by Darby (1976), our 
replacement ratio is represented by the relative wage of an emergency worker, funded 
through various New Deal programmes.  
 
3 Empirical wage specification and data 
 
Our empirical wage equation contains three main features.  First, it incorporates the 
potential productivity, work intensity, unemployment and replacement ratio variables 
arising from the foregoing discussion. Second, following Bernanke (1986), it includes 
two variables to capture the level of government relief and the strength of the labor 
movement respectively. As detailed in the Data Appendix, Strike is intended to capture 
the resurgence of the labor movement after the New Deal and NRA is intended to capture 
any wage impact of the National Recovery Act. Third, it embraces data determined 
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dynamic influences through separate nominal wage and price inflation terms in order to 
capture short term nominal inertia which can reflect generalized dynamic adjustment, 
including aggregation effects generated by staggered contracting. 
For each industry, the complete specification is given by 
  
(14)     ∆lnWt = b0 + Σb1i  ∆lnWt-i+ Σb2i  ∆lnPt-i + Σb3i  ∆lnθt-i  + b4i Σ∆ln ut-i 
 
      + b5 ln(W/P)t-1 + b6 lnφ*t-1 + b7 lnθt-1 + b8 ln ut-2 
 
      + b8 ln rt + b9  Striket + b10  NRAt + seasonals + vt   
 
 
where W is the nominal wage; P is the consumers’ expenditure deflator; θ is work 
intensity, u is the measured unemployment rate and φ* is potential productivity and v is 
an error term.  Nominal wages, potential productivity and work intensity are measured on 
an industry specific basis, all other variables are whole economy measures. Data were 
obtained from Bernanke and Parkinson (1991), and we present estimates for 7 of their 10 
industries. These are Leather, Lumber, Petrol, Paper and Pulp, Rubber, Steel, and 
Textiles9.  The original data are monthly.  However, we follow Bernanke and Parkinson’s 
approach of temporally aggregating monthly to quarterly observations in order to reduce 
the effects of possible measurement error or temporal misalignments in data from 
different primary sources.   
                                                 
9  We omit two industries that were included in Bernanke and Parkinson’s dataset - Non Ferrous Metals and 
Sand, and Clay and Glass - because the data were available for a significantly shorter sample period.   We 
also excluded Autos. Data for automobile production showed a pronounced cyclical pattern, which evolved 
over time and probably stemmed from the release of new models on an annual basis, a practice that 
continued throughout the Depression. We attempted to seasonally adjust this production data prior to 
calculating productivity, potential productivity and work intensity.  However, our resulting time series 
proved to be unconvincing, reflecting the difficulty in separately identifying the extent of product cycles 
and their affects as opposed to the impact the Depression.  A marked peak in productivity was estimated 
immediately prior to 1929. Productivity plummeted during the Depression, thereafter, there was a mild 
recovery, but essentially productivity remained flat and well below the prior peak.  
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Our measures of potential productivity and work intensity are constructed using the 
trends-through-peaks methodology suggested in Fair (1985). These series are illustrated 
in Figure 1, with actual and potential productivity shown in the upper graphs and work 
intensity in the lower graphs10.  In estimation, we do not use data beyond 1939 so as to 
avoid the impact of WWII on measured productivity.  The calculated trends represent 
potential productivity (φ*) and are based on logged series, so productivity grows at a 
constant rate between successive peaks.   
The Paper and Pulp and Textile industries display downward spikes in measured 
productivity and work intensity that best fit with a priori expectations.  These occur quite 
markedly at the time of the Depression and, again, at the recession that began in 1937.  
Leather is quite similar although in this case the Depression impact appears to have been  
delayed by one year.  Steel also shows a delayed response though in this case the 
influence of the Depression is less clearly differentiated from other periods of 
productivity downswings. The Depression is clearly the major period of productivity 
decline in Petrol.  By contrast, productivity movements in Lumber and Rubber do not   
appear to be unduly influenced by the early Depression11, although Rubber does show a 
downward productivity movement in 1937. 
                                                 
10 In practice, two key alternatives are also widely used. The first is detrending through the application of 
simple filters (e.g. Hodrick Prescott).  In the present context, this would focus on obtaining "average" rather 
than peak work intensity and, for our purposes, they give too much influence to the below-peak data points.  
The second is to use a stochastic frontier approach that explicitly attempts to fit the outer envelope of the 
curve.  In practice, this would require us to estimate a behavioural equation determining peak productivity 
and unfortunately the available data precludes this level of detail. 
      
11  While Bernstein (1987) does report short-run downturns in product demand in these two industries 
during the early 1930s, secular influences were clearly very strong.  A slow growth in the housing market, 
due to immigration restrictions, together with a low rate of population growth were clearly important 
factors in Lumber. Also, there was a growing substitution of metal products for timber used in construction. 
(see Fabricant (1940)). In Rubber, the continual improvement in tyres, mounting foreign competition, and a 
slow development in alternative uses for the product combined to shrink the market.  
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Figure 1:  Actual and Potential Productivity and Work Intensity in Seven Manufacturing Industries, 1921-1942 
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Figure 1 [continued…] 
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4. Estimation and Results 
Estimation of equation (14) is by three stage least squares, involving simultaneous 
estimation of all the industry wage equations augmented by industry specific equations for 
work intensity and for whole economy consumer price inflation. This approach ensures that 
the wage equations treat the change in work intensity and consumer price inflation as 
endogenously determined. The instrumenting regressions for the change in work intensity 
include lagged work intensity, industry specific producer price inflation, lagged changes in 
hours worked and unemployment, while instruments for consumer price inflation include 
terms in lagged inflation and unemployment, their explanatory power is confirmed by 
significant equation F tests. Instrumental variables estimation of each industry’s wage 
equation would be consistent but three stage least squares estimation has the added advantage 
of improving the efficiency of estimation given cross equation correlations in the residuals 
which are highly likely in the presence of common shocks across all industries. The relative 
advantage of three stage least squares increases with the strength of the interrelations among 
the error terms (Besley, 1988). We would expect that the Great Depression is one of the most 
dramatic common shocks imaginable and a reduction in the virtually all the coefficients 
standard errors are evident when comparing the three stage least squares and instrumental 
variables estimates. Finally a Hausman test comparing SUR estimates of the full system with 
three stage least squares again confirm the superiority of our three stage least squares 
estimates12. 
                                                 
12 A Hausman test was used to compare 3SLS and SUR estimates of the industry wage equations. Under the null  
hypothesis for this test is that SUR is efficient, while 3SLS is consistent under both the null and alternative. The 
test checks for systematic differences in the estimates. We are easily able to reject the null hypothesis that the 
difference between the estimates is not systematic (the relevant test statistic is 201.9 and is distributed as 
χ2(83)and the probability value for the test is .00). We conclude that SUR is inconsistent and 3SLS is the 
preferred estimator.. 
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Table 1:   Estimated Wage Equations  
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal wage, ∆ln(W/P)t, data are quarterly and the 
sample period is 1924:1-1939:4. Estimation is by three stage least squares and standard errors are given in 
parenthesis. 
 
 Leather Lumber Petrol Pulp Rubber Steel Textiles 
        
ln(W/P)t-1 -0.453 
(0.073) 
-0.262 
(0.057) 
-0.173 
(0.033) 
-0.179 
(0.026) 
-0.135 
(0.047) 
-0.264 
(0.055) 
-0.406 
(0.036) 
        
lnφ*t 0.332 
(0.083) 
0.242 
(0.080) 
0.106 
(0.028) 
0.103 
(0.020) 
0.044 
(0.025) 
0.277 
(0.076) 
0.193 
(0.035) 
        
∆ lnWt-1 0.201 
(0.073) 
   -0.386 
(0.095) 
0.221 
(0.064) 
0.335 
(0.050) 
        
∆ lnWt-2    0.353 
(0.055) 
 0.131 
(0.065) 
 
        
∆ lnPt    0.869 
(0.105) 
0.605 
(0.211) 
 1.059 
(0.141) 
        
∆ lnPt-1 1.195 
(0.271) 
0.726 
(0.235) 
   0.680 
(0.241) 
0.858 
(0.180) 
        
∆ lnθt 0.423 
(0.074) 
0.190 
(0.059) 
0.263 
(0.050) 
0.227 
(0.036) 
  0.161 
(0.032) 
        
∆ lnθt-2    0.103 
(0.035) 
  0.095 
(0.029) 
        
lnθt-2  0.319 
(0.059) 
     
        
∆ ln ut-2      -0.183 
(0.035) 
-0.037 
(0.010) 
        
ln ut-1 -0.065 
(0.015) 
      
        
ln rt 0.023 
(0.005) 
     0.018 
(0.003) 
        
Striket -0.108 
(0.048) 
0.112 
(0.041) 
0.146 
(0.028) 
0.068 
(0.020) 
0.144 
(0.041) 
0.114 
(0.048) 
-0.058 
(0.032) 
        
NRAt 0.023 
(0.005) 
0.020 
(0.012) 
0.026 
(0.008) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
0.048 
(0.012) 
0.021 
(0.013) 
0.041 
(0.010) 
        
“R-Squared” 0.714 0.764 0.624 0.829 0.485 0.787 0.857 
Serial 
Correlation:  
LM(1) 
 
 
2.20[.14] 
 
 
1.92[.17] 
 
 
0.76[.39] 
 
 
0.26[.61] 
 
 
0.73[.39] 
 
 
0.06[.81] 
 
 
0.11[.74] 
LM(3) 
 
4.24[.24]  3.29[.36] 1.35[.72] 0.94[.81] 2.20[.53] 0.01[.99] 1.68[.64] 
 
Variable definitions: W/P = real average hourly wage, W = average nominal hourly wage, P = consumer price 
index, φ* = potential productivity, θ = work intensity, u = unemployment rate, r = relative wage of emergency 
workers, Strike = thousands of man days lost through strikes, NRA = national recovery act dummy. Information 
on data sources is provided in an appendix. Estimation was conducted using Stata. “R-Squared” is the pseudo R-
squared reported by Stata. The tests for Serial Correlation are LM tests from auxiliary regressions, p-values are 
reported in brackets.  
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Estimates of equation (14) are shown in Table 1. While we apply a common model to 
all seven industries, our approach is sufficiently versatile to enable us to identify some 
interesting differences in wage responsiveness across industries.  The reported equations are  
the result of application of a general-to-specific methodology (see, for example, Hendry 
1994). The general specifications for each industry incorporated sufficient lags of the 
differenced terms so as to be consistent with an absence of significant serial correlation. 
These specifications constitute a benchmark against which parsimonious representations were 
tested.  The table reports the final wage equations for each industry.  
The first row of coefficients in the table pin down the adjustment in the level of the 
real wage,  ensuring that wages and prices to move one for one in the long run. The size of the 
real wage coefficient determines the speed of adjustment (the coefficient has to lie between 0 
and -1, and the closer to -1 the faster the adjustment). It is important to note that the 
coefficient is significantly different from zero in every case,as this provides a check on the 
validity of the theoretical specification.  
There are two major areas of interest in the results. 
(i) Potential productivity and competition 
 
The estimates in Table l indicate that potential productivity has a strongly significant 
positive influence on wages in all seven industries. It is useful to compare the coefficient on 
lagged potential productivity (row 2) with that on the lagged real wage (row 1). Where these 
coefficients are equal in size and opposite in sign, the implication is that a given increase in 
potential productivity will, in the long-run, lead to the same increase in real wages, ceteris 
paribus.  The summary table below reports freely estimated long-run coefficients on potential 
productivity. In the case of Steel, the freely estimated coefficients imply that wage growth 
outpaces potential productivity growth in the long run. However, upon testing, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit long run coefficient. Furthermore imposing this data 
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admissible restriction has very little impact on the remaining coefficients, all our key 
conclusions continue to hold.  
 
Table 2 – The estimated long run impact of potential productivity on real wages 
 Leather Lumber Petrol Pulp Rubber Steel Textiles 
        
LR 0.73 0.92 0.61 0.58 0.33 1.05 0.48 
        
t-test of H0 
LR coef =1  
[p-value] 
1.7[.08] 0.4[.67] 4.0[.00] 5.0[.00] 2.8[.01] 0.4[.72] 5.9[.00] 
        
 
In the remaining industries our estimates suggest that wage growth fell behind that of 
potential productivity.  This is particularly clear in the rubber industry, which benefited from 
large productivity gains during our sample period. Nelson (1988) points out that these gains 
were achieved largely as a result of the introduction of automated tyre cutting. However, the 
consequent increased durability of tyres was combined with depressed demand from a 
weakened Autos industry. (In general, the Depression had a greater impact on demand for 
durable goods such as Autos.)   In addition, the late 1920s and early 1930s marked a 
significant increase in foreign competition in this industry, particularly from Malaysia. These 
factors would have acted to moderate wage growth even in the face of substantial advances in 
potential productivity.  Competitive pressures also impacted on Textiles manufacturers, as 
discussed in Davis et al. (1972). They note that fierce competition from expanding textile 
mills in Southern states had been a key factor in driving down prices and remuneration in the 
older established mills, well before the Depression years. In the 1930s the industry faced 
“fundamental alterations… not only in the sector's geographical location within the United 
States and around the world but also the industry’s role within American manufacturing" 
(Bernstein, 1987). 
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(ii) Internal and external measures of excess labor supply 
 
Work intensity is measured as the gap between actual and potential hours' efficiency. 
Changes in potential productivity only occur slowly over time, so reductions in work intensity 
tend to be caused by a drop in product demand that is not matched by a full adjustment in the 
stock of employment.  Contemporaneous changes in work intensity have a significant impact 
on wage adjustments in five of the seven industries.  The level of work intensity enters 
significantly in the Lumber equation13.  
Only in the Rubber and Steel industries do we fail to identify any significant impact 
from work intensity. In each of these industries other authors have pointed to evidence that 
firms responded to falling demand for their products in ways that left workers achieving their 
productive ‘norms’ over a shorter working week. The rubber industry was dominated by tyre 
manufacture and Nelson (1988) points out that the industry- rather than firm- specific nature 
of human capital had led to high labor turnover. A common response was for firms to provide 
career employment plans, company sponsored housing and social centers etc. A 6-hour day 
was introduced as a way of retaining employees in key positions.  "While the six hour day 
was an ad hoc response to the depression, it was consistent with…[Goodyear's] larger 
goals…[One of which] as to maintain a cadre of experienced employees…[in order to] take 
maximum advantage of the revival, as…in 1922" (Nelson, 1988, p. 114).  This reduction in 
working time may well have served significantly to offset the need to reduce the degree of 
work intensity. In the Steel industry too there is evidence that firms found it efficient to 
operate on a part-time basis, working their employees a few days of the week on 'spread-
work' schedules (see Bernanke, 1986, p.89 and Daugherty et al., 1937, p.165). Note that this 
                                                 
13   This may owe something to the marked secular decline in these industries which predated the Great 
Depression. The decline in lumber reflected a shift in demand away from wood and toward concrete and steel for 
use in construction. In contrast to say the pulp industry, the lumber industry did not diversify into new products 
until the war.  
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might have enabled firms to pay constant or rising real hourly wages although, as emphasised 
by Bernanke, weekly earnings were bound to suffer.   
By contrast, the exisiting literature reveals a number of other industries were 
remarkably adaptable. For example, in the Paper and Pulp although output fell and 
bankruptcy was rife, there is evidence that the surviving producers became adept at 
developing new products14 and anticipating market changes (Bernstein, 1987, p85.). These 
changes addressed head on the need to eliminate under utilization and to restore potential 
productivity. Both effects come through strongly in the results in Table 1. 
Unemployment, our measure of external excess labor supply, is a significant 
determinant of wages in only three industries, Leather, Textiles and and Steel, and it’s notable 
that the effect is delayed, and relatively small. The replacement ratio, r, only has a significant 
impact in the Leather and Textiles equations. 
 
5  Concluding comments 
 
In line with other studies, we find a weak association between real wages and 
unemployment within U.S. industries during the Great Depression.  While real wages were 
not significantly associated with this extensive margin measure of excess labor supply, we do 
obtain much stronger support for an influence from its intensive margin equivalent – i.e. an 
excess of total paid-for hours relative to effective actual hours worked.  Since this internal 
excess hours supply grew considerably during the Great Depression we argue that the 
associated reduction in work intensity would have been expected to impact directly on the real 
wage.  In the long-term, potential productivity is found to have a comprehensively strong 
positive effect on real wages.  Where work intensity falls below levels associated with 
meeting potential productivity then, for most of our industries, there is a significant negative 
                                                 
14 The creation of new product lines included paperboard containers (which were increasingly substituted for 
wooden products), cheaper grades of writing paper, paper towels, tissues and various medical products.  
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impact on real wage growth. The change in work intensity, as opposed to its level, is found to 
play the major role.   
Without a doubt, improved measurement and data refinements may well serve to 
modify our findings.  First, the productivity-based trends-through-peaks method of proxying 
work intensity is something of a blunt instrument in that it does not allow us to discriminate 
between traditional labor market explanations of changes in work intensity and other factors 
that may have affected productive performance.  Ohanian (2002) tells us that obvious work 
intensity related variables, like changes in capacity utilization and labor hoarding, possibly 
accounted for only about one-third of the decline in total factor productivity at this time. In 
fact, Ohanian suggests decreases in organization capital – ‘the knowledge firms use to 
organize production’ – as an additional factor behind the observed productivity decreases. 
Unfortunately, in practice our measure of work intensity may be influenced by the adverse 
effects of the Depression on firms’ organizational efficiency in respect of production and 
inventory scheduling, supplier relationships, and marketing strategies, but it is likely to be 
difficult if not impossible to model all these factors simultaneously, so we are forced simply 
to note this potential weakness.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, the use of more 
micro-level data might well reveal composition biases that lead us to revise upward the 
significance of the role the external market played in the wage determination process at this 
time.  If the industry-level data hide the fact that low-skilled workers showed higher 
propensities to (a) lose their jobs in the early 1930s and (b) be hired during the later recovery 
phase, then our unemployment effects will almost certainly be underestimating the true 
procyclicality of real wages (see Solon et al., 1994). 
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Data Appendix 
 Definition Source 
W/P real wage = nominal wage / CPI Constructed 
W nominal wage = average hourly earnings, 
constructed as pay/(emp.ahw) converted into an 
index, 1937=100 
pay = payroll, by industry 
emp = total employment, by industry  
ahw = average hours worked, by industry 
 
construct using date provided 
by Bernanke and Parkinson 
(BP), original sources 
National Industiral 
Conference Board (NICB) 
and Bureau of Labour 
Statistics (BLS) 
P consumer price index, CPI BP, BLS 
φ productivity= iip/(emp.ahw); constructed 
 iip = index of industrial production BP, Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
φ* Potential productivity defined as trend through peaks constructed (see Figure 1) 
θ work intensity =φ ÷ φ* constructed 
u unemployment rate NBER 
r Replacement rate = relative wage of an emergency 
worker, funded through various New Deal 
programmes. 
Darby (1976) 
Strike Takes the value 0 up to 1935, then is equal to the  
thousands of man-days idled by strikes in the US 
economy as a whole (this includes strikes beginning 
in the quarter as well as those still in progress from a 
previous quarter).  Industry specific data is not 
available.           
BP, BLS Bulletins 
NRA A dummy variable intended to capture any wage 
impact of the National Recovery Act and is set to 1 
from 1933:4 – 1935:2 and to zero otherwise.  
constructed as per Bernanke 
(1986) 
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